When was ex parte crouse decided

In re Gault addressed the separation of adult and juvenile courts, and Fifth and Sixth Amendment privileges for juveniles. Gerald Gault, a year-old juvenile, had been sentenced to a maximum of six years in a state training school for making obscene phone calls to a woman.

The case was originally heard in a very informal juvenile court proceeding. The accused was not represented by an attorney, and there was no transcript of the hearing. The Supreme Court ruled that the juvenile courts must protect the constitutional rights of juveniles, and rules and regulations must be imposed in the juvenile justice system:.

Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not constitute a kangaroo court. The traditional ideas of the juvenile court procedure, indeed, contemplated that time would be available and care would be used to establish precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it. In re Gault, U. However, the following year, the right to trial by a jury of peers for juveniles was denied by the Supreme Court in McKeiver v.

The Supreme Court justices also felt that allowing juvenile trials by jury would be an indication that the juvenile courts had lost their usefulness. Home Information. Find Attorney. For Attorneys. We Help! No Hassles Guarantee. Search: Search. Popular forms. The Supreme Court ruled that the juvenile courts must protect the constitutional rights of juveniles, and rules and regulations must be imposed in the juvenile justice system: Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not constitute a kangaroo court.

For Consumer Information Legal Forms. Services Attorney Assistance. The petition for the habeas corpus was in the name of her father. By the return to the writ it appeared, that the girl had been committed to the custody of the managers by virtue of a warrant under the hand and seal of Morton Mc Michael, Esq.

The House of Refuge was established in pursuance of an Act of Assembly passed on the 23d day of March Second: Infants committed by the authority aforesaid, where complaint and due proof have been made that such infant is a proper subject for the guardianship of the managers of the House of Refuge, in consequence of vagrancy, or of incorrigible or vicious conduct, and that from the moral depravity or otherwise of the parent or next friend in whose custody such infant may be, such parent or next friend is incapable or unwilling to exercise the proper care and discipline over such incorrigible or vicious infant.

Third: Infants committed by the courts of the Commonwealth in the mode provided by the act to which this is a supplement.

Hirst, for the petitioner, now contended, that these provisions, so far as they authorized the committal and detention of an infant without a trial by jury, were unconstitutional. He referred to the sixth and ninth sections of the Bill of Rights; and cited the Commonwealth v. Addicks , 5 Binn. Murray , 4 Binn. Barclay and Mr. Ingersoll, for the managers of the House of Refuge. Per Curiam. Where reformation, and not punishment, is the end, it may indeed be used as a prison for juvenile convicts who would else be committed to a common goal; and in respect to these, the constitutionality of the act which incorporated it, stands clear of controversy.