Why should i be virtuous

According to "virtue ethics", there are certain ideals, such as excellence or dedication to the common good, toward which we should strive and which allow the full development of our humanity.

These ideals are discovered through thoughtful reflection on what we as human beings have the potential to become. They enable us to pursue the ideals we have adopted. Honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, fidelity, integrity, fairness, self-control, and prudence are all examples of virtues. How does a person develop virtues? Virtues are developed through learning and through practice. As the ancient philosopher Aristotle suggested, a person can improve his or her character by practicing self-discipline, while a good character can be corrupted by repeated self-indulgence.

Just as the ability to run a marathon develops through much training and practice, so too does our capacity to be fair, to be courageous, or to be compassionate. Virtues are habits. That is, once they are acquired, they become characteristic of a person. The eudaemonist holds that virtuous living constitutes my happiness. But why do I make virtue a constituent of my happiness? Is it because first horn I happen to find that my virtuous living is my happy living or does it make me happy because second horn it is intrinsically worthwhile?

Rudebusch, Either horn we choose will conduce to the same: eudaemonism is another selfregarding theory of the good, and should be avoided for the same reasons we use to avoid the egoist view. There are also other-regarding theories of the good: selfless altruism and self- including altruism.

Both claim that the good is the good of others. But they seem to be ruled out for similar reasons as the previous ones, because they are agent-relative accounts 9. All those theories are perfectionists, in the sense all of them define ''the good and the good human soul in terms of human nature and the good human life But perfectionism need not make the good agent-relative in this way Rudebusch, Although he recognizes there is no consensus in contemporary ethical theory about which theory could be superior agent-relative or agent-neutral , he thinks the study of Socratic ethics can illuminate this discussion.

I think his interpretation is both cogent and original. To support it he goes to The Republic , where Socrates gives his account of expertise. There, Thrasymachus says: ''No craftsman, expert, or ruler makes an error at the moment when he is ruling A ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for himself a, Grube trans.

Then Socrates answers analyzing the examples of a doctor and a ship's captain, and makes Thrasymachus realize that their expertise has something advantageous to bodies and sailors. This is, ''no other craft seeks its own advantage —for it has no further needs- but the advantage of that of which it is the craft c, Grube trans. As a result, Socrates claims, ''no one in any position of rule, insofar as he is a ruler, seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his subject, that on which he practices his craft e, Grube trans.

Rudebusch claims that expertise, in this sense, must be agent- neutral in his motivation. It would be just the health in general, the virtue, and so on. Obviously, there are some possible objections to this interpretation he considers two but mentions at least seven Nevertheless, he thinks his account is better than the rivals, because if we take a rival theory to be true ''we would have to attribute, uncharitable, an inferior theoretical account to Socrates, whether as egoist, which is morally repugnant and incompatible with his claims that wisdom is necessary and virtue sufficient for happiness, or as eudaemonist, which escapes moral repugnance only by ceasing to be self-regarding in all but name Rudebusch, As I said before, Rudebusch's view is both cogent and original.

Moreover, it seems to be a good attempt to solve the puzzle of Socrates making statements about human motivation that sounds egoists while framing an ethical theory that describes the virtuous agent as one with high moral standards. Nevertheless, it is not clear enough why should we prefer a neutral-agent theory instead an agent-relative one. After all, an agent-regarding account need not be morally reprehensible. Irwin holds an interpretation according to which Socrates is a eudaemonist.

But, unlike Rudebusch, he claims eudaemonism doesn't entail an ethically objectionable egoism. These questions about ethical egoism are not about Plato's concerns. He is not trying to describe morality, as we tend to understand it, or to defend egoism from what we call the moral point of view.

He wants to know what in general it is rational for someone to do; and this question remains to be asked when we understand what the moral point of view is and what it requires —if we identify morality by its concern for other people's, or everyone's, interest. Plato is not offering an absurd way to understand morality, but asking the apparently sensible question whether it is worthwhile to do what morality is normally supposed to require Irwin, By distinguishing between two types of egoism, Irwin shows it is possible to avoid the charge against eudaimonism that says it entails not genuine other-regarding virtues.

There is moral solipsism, which considers all virtues as instrumentally valuable for the agent's good, apart from any benefit or harm to other people; and moral egocentrism, which says ''virtue must contribute to some end valued by the agent as part of his own good Irwin, We can find evidence in Platonic dialogues to hold both Plato and Socrates are and they are not solipsists.

Protagoras, some passages from the Republic, and Plato's contemplative ideal seem to support the solipsist view. Pheado, Pheadrus, Republic II, Grogias, and the just man's 'propagative' desire at the Symposium appear to hold the opposite non-solipsist position. But Irwin asks us to think which is the ''Plato's normal view of psychic harmony in the Republic'' Irwin, As many others have suggested, the main contradiction with the egoist view arises when we consider friendship, love, and justice on Platonic account, because they imply regard for others.

Irwin claims that to understand how his conception of justice doesn't imply solipsism we should think on the state of the soul Plato says is that of the just man:.

He does not think of just actions as instrumental means to some separate state of the soul which might persist without further just action. If someone has the inner peace and extensible psychic harmony of the p-just man, but does not care about just action, Plato will simply deny that he is p-just or is really controlled by the rational part; if p-justice were simply inner harmony, it could not be denied to the deviant men.

Plato expects the really just man to have the kind of psychic order which chooses just actions or, in the Symposium's terms, wants to propagate virtue Irwin, So it could be seen egocentric, because it is justified by the virtuous man's own final good; but this final good is not solipsistic. There is an important difference, Irwin points out here, between self-love and the love of the non-rational part of the soul.

The prior doesn't conflict with the pursuit of virtue and altruistic morality. In despite of the good defense Irwin has made of moral Socratic theory, in the sense it could be seen as altruistic, it is interesting to notice some problems regarding the relation with others in this view. Consider, for instance, that Socratic altruism depends on his theory of love 'Platonic love' , one of whose more important features is the search of the improvement of the beloved.

In this sense, there is no reciprocity in his view. In Irwin 's words:. Plato is open to objection for his view of the beloved 's role in the process; the metaphor of the lover as sculptor and the beloved as statue revels the serious fault Phdr. As a result, we are justified in going back and ask again: 'Is he considering persons and their interests by their sake, or just as a sort of instrument?

We contrast the 'concern for someone for his own sake' with purely exploitative concern, with his use as an instrument to achieve my ideals. He says: ''And so if A tries to make B more just, then, on Plato 's view, he is not exploiting B for some ideal irrelevant to B's interests; but he is promoting B 's overriding interest'' Irwin, This means the Platonic lover have non- exploitative concern for the beloved 's interests.

There is still another interesting objection to Platonic theory that Irwin considers, related with altruism and his view of justice. If we think that justice has to do with interest and people 's rights, a similar problem arises than that regarding interests.

Plato 's moral theory accords rights to no one. Irwin claims: ''Plato assumes that justice will always benefit the recipient; but he recognizes no duties of justice which protect a man 's rights even against his own interests'' Irwin, At this point, we could ask why Plato holds eudaimonism or, in other words, which are the advantages of the eudaemonist's view, given the problems that seems to entail.

According to Irwin, it gives a convincingly answer to the question about how we should live, the role of virtues in achieving a good life, and moral obligation:. The appeal to a final good is Plato's procedure for asking a question a rational man is right to ask, and for answering it; when the procedure is rightly understood, it is clearer that he does not seek to show that morality promotes a solipsist end, but that it is worthwhile in itself for someone who correctly decides the kind of life he has best reason to choose [ Irwin, We have seen four attempts to explain a puzzle that rises when we consider some Platonic passages were Socrates says we should do the best to achieve virtue while in others seems to reduce the criteria to choose between actions to the consideration of the final agent 's good.

The last criterion is the agent 's happiness. If we understand this later affirmation as Socrates holding egoism, the explanation of friendship, love, and justice as regard for others doesn 't seem to fit in his theory as a whole.

I have argued that formalists approaches that try to show Socrates holds egoism as a dialectical tool to support another thesis fail in the sense that seem to rule out a coherent explanation of those notions inside the Socratic theory. Because of that, I considered approaches I called substantives, in order to make sense of what seemed contradictory on Socratic theory of human motivation to act.

I founded Irwin approach the most satisfactory, due his deeply and broad understanding of Socratic and Platonic theory that shows it is possible for Socrates to be eudaemonist and self-regarded without being egoist.

His interpretation is strongly supported by the evidence, rigorous, and can make sense of different concepts of great importance within Socratic theory, as that of friendship, love, and justice. There 's no need to ask further, 'What 's the point of wanting happiness? In fact, Irwin 's account is prior to the first type of answers that I call formalist. In despite of the time that is between all those considerations, I think Irwin 's view is still the most satisfactory to the question I am trying to answer.

George Klosko and George Nakhnikian, the authors I am considering here show that very well. Moreover, they not only give good and abundant evidence to support their position, they also make formalization of Socrates arguments and analyze them in detail.

I just think they fail to see the Socratic theory as a coherent corpus. In addition to the art of weighing pleasures, our heavy friend would require the fortitude to use it'' Klosko, In fact, there are 26 years between them. And I really think Klosko suggestion is cogent, original, and puts Socratic theory in the best position between moral theories because integrates virtues, moral obligation and impartiality.

But I think his interpretation is too much charitative, and it is not well supported by the evidence. In fact, in certain sense I attach my view to the traditional view about Socratic theory, which sees it mainly interested on the concept of virtue rather than on the concept of duty as the central notion to evaluate human actions. His advice in the Apology 28b and Crito 48c-d that there is 'only one thing to consider' —namely virtue- is a locus classicus, together with the scripture passages of the doctrine of single-mined devotion to virtue.

Or at least those reasons are not clear enough to me. He just claims: ''I have included the other-regarding altruisms alongside of self- regarding egoism and eudaimonism for two reasons.

First, it casts eudaimonism —quite properly, in my opinion- in a negative light. For 'self-including altruism' will, I take it, strike everyone as a peculiar, indeed dishonest concept: an altruism in which the only good maybe the self 's! By analogy, other- including eudaimonism, in which the only good may be that of others, should seem just as unacceptable as an ethical theory. The second reason is that, by exhausting the possibilities of agent-relative accounts, the diagram makes it apparent why agent-relativism as a hole is unacceptable.

He gives a diagram and expects we see there the reason why is it unacceptable, but I just cannot see them. Because there are a lot of discussion about the classification of Platonic dialogues and the correspondence of the view to Socrates or Plato, I will just continue my work without paying too much attention to this particular issue.

We can keep thinking on Socrates as the character of the Platonic dialogues and evaluate his position as we have been doing it. Our relationships are the most important things in the world. For most, family is at the top of the list in terms of values and priorities.

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Natural light sources include the Sun and stars. Artificial light sources include lamp posts and televisions. Without light sources we could not see the world around us, however not every object we can see is a light source. Many objects simply reflect light from a light source. The EM spectrum is generally divided into seven regions, in order of decreasing wavelength and increasing energy and frequency. The common designations are: radio waves, microwaves, infrared IR , visible light, ultraviolet UV , X-rays and gamma rays.

Light is a form of electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength which can be detected by the human eye. It is a small part of the electromagnetic spectrum and radiation given off by stars like the sun. Begin typing your search term above and press enter to search. Press ESC to cancel. Skip to content Home Essay What is virtue and why is it important?

Ben Davis April 30, What is virtue and why is it important? What is virtue in life? What is virtue ethics example? What is the main idea of virtue ethics? Why are virtue ethics important in life? What are the 12 virtues?

Is Virtue Ethics good or bad?